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Introduction 
If one theme has captured the imagination of business writers in the last several 
years it is the way Information Technology (IT) has been used as a competitive weapon 
and even to restructure industries. By now, almost everyone is familiar with American 
Hospital Supply, the company that installed terminals in their client's offices permitting 
them to provide better service in supplying medical goods, at a reduced cost, and, a t  the 
same time, locking in their customer base. M S 7 s  position as the dominant firm in their 
industry is attributed to this strategy. 
Does it really happen this easily? Do executives scan the environment looking for 
opportunities to  apply information technology? Is top management really tracking 
technology? Are firms likely to be any better at capitalizing on the use of IT to achieve 
strategic objectives than they are at building normal information systems1, or for that 
matter, accomplishing any strategic goal? 
In this paper, the evolution of the notion of using information technology to 
accomplish strategic objectives is traced. Second, the literature on organizations and 
strategy is examined to identify some critical questions involving the use IT. Then, the 
major themes of the book are introduced. 
Strategic Use of Information Technology 
Gorry and Scott-Morton were some of the first authors to recognize distinctions 
among information systems [Gorry 711. They arrayed them by managerial activity2 and 
l o n e  study found that  well over 60% of the projects that  complete feasibility study phase end in 
failure. 
'strategic planning, management control, and operational control were the categories used t o  represent 
managerial activity, following on work by Anthony. 
the types of decisions involved3 pointing out that areas of most concern to management 
were unstructured decisions. They argued that the greatest payoff to organizations 
occurs a t  a strategic level where problems are rich in ambiguity and uncertainty. 
Decisions at  this level are highly leveraged, improvements could have a high payoff for 
things that really matter. This work Ied to the recognition that Decision Support 
Systems (DSS) were distinct from normal data processing ones. Gorry and Scott- 
Morton's focus, however, was on using computer technology to improve managerial 
decision-making through a process of model building and learning. If a competitive 
advantage occurred as a result, it was coincidental. 
In 1982, Hank Lucas and Jon Turner observed that information technology can be 
used to  achieve strategic managerial objectives in three fundamentally different 
ways [Lucas 821. First, it can be used to obtain greater e f f i c i e n c i e s  in existing 
operations, for example, in reducing variable costs (decreasing marginal costs) through 
automation of routine activities, or in improving services to clients through better use of 
information. Then, it can be used to improve the strategic p lann ing  process by the 
development of policy analysis support systems. Finally, technology can be used to 
open n e w  m a r k e t s  through the development of novel products or services that rely on or 
incorporate technology directly. Although the authors identified many of the factors 
involved in executing these strategies, the focus was still technology, stressing (or 
classifying) the way it was used. 
Greg Parsons noted a year later that if information technology was to become a 
viable competitive weapon, senior management would have to understand how its use 
impacted the competitive environment and the strategy of a firm [Parsons 831. He 
identified three levels of interaction. At the i n d u s t r y  level, IT can change the products 
and services offered, the markets and the economics of production through fundamental 
changes in processes. At the f i r m  level, IT affects relationships among buyers and 
suppliers, influences substitution, acts as a barrier to new entrants, and is an arena in 
3~tructured and unstructured were the classes of decisions, based on work by Simon. 
which rivalries can be contested. Finally, at the strategy level, a firm can use IT to 
become a low-cost leader, to differentiate its products from others in the field (usually 
by incorporating technology into them, for example as a control element or to provide a 
display), or to  customize the product so that it satisfies a market or product niche. The 
significance of Parsons work was that it shifted the analytic perspective away from 
technology to  a firm's strategy and that he incorporated the vocabulary of strategic 
planning. 
Warren McFarlan expanded on this theme by observing that information 
technology can add value to products and be used to throw competitors off 
balance [McFarlan 841. The issue, from his perspective, is searching for opportunities. 
IT can be used to build barriers to entry. IT can change the balance of power in 
supplier relationships and generate new products. IT can be used to build in switching 
costs and to  change the basis of competition. Here McFarlan, as Parsons had done, 
directly links technology to Porter's three categories of competitive strategy: cost 
based, product differentiation, and market niche [Porter 791. 
Porter clarifies many of these issues in his paper on how information technology 
can be used to obtain a competitive advantage [Porter 851. Information technology is 
conceived even more broadly as  i n f o r m a t i o n  a businesses creates and uses as well as the 
wide spectrum of increasingly convergent technologies that process this information. 
Porter uses the notion of a "value chain" to describe ways IT can reshape the process 
by which companies create their products as well as the products themselves. An 
important concept here is that of "linkages" where the way one activity is performed 
affects the cost, or effectiveness of other activities. By managing these linkages, a firm 
can gain advantages, often by passing costs on to  others, who come either earlier or 
later in the value chain, such as suppliers or distributors, or through fundamental 
alteration in the process of production. Porter insightfully observes that every value 
activity has both a physical and an in format ional  component. While the tendency has 
been to focus more on management of the physical activity, information and processing 
associated with a value activity has many unexplored opportunities for advantage - 
sometimes even being sold as a separate product. 
Porter's focus on information and how it can be constructively used for advantage 
is an important contribution. Not only does it shift the major interest away from 
technology itself, but i t  ties the thrust back t o  original decision-making themes. I t  is, of 
course, the information provided by technology that  is important rather than the 
technology itsel@. 
Williamson suggests that there are two basic ways of coordinating organizational 
activity [Williamson 751. Internal hierarchies can be used to  establish price, quantity, 
quality and schedule for a given product. In this case suppliers are not selected from a 
group of potential candidates; they are directed by management. Conversely, an 
external market can be used to  determine suppliers based on their ability t o  meet cost, 
quantity, quality and schedule objectives. This approach uses traditional market 
mechanisms of supply and demand t o  provide information for selection and 
coordination. 
Relatively little information is needed t o  accomplish coordination with hierarchies 
because choices are limited and predetermined. In this case production costs tend t o  be 
higher without competition t o  drive them down. With external markets, considerable 
information must be gathered and processed t o  identify appropriate suppliers (and 
control them). As a result of the competitive market mechanism, however, production 
costs will be less. Thus, a trade-off exists for a firm between costs of coordination that  
are primarily information processing and cost of production [Malone 861. 
In summary, the field has moved away from classifying uses of information 
technology t o  an inspection of all aspects of a company in search of opportunities to  
apply information t o  gain a competitive advantage. While this is an impressive shift in 
perspective, it does raise some difficult questions given the current understanding of 
4~owever,  as Lucas and Turner observe, this presumes an organization has control over its technology 
and can shape it to achieve desired objectives. 
how organizations function. 
An Organizational Perspective 
Literature concerned with the strategic role of information technology has largely 
ignored the organizational context in which all strategic planning must be done. While 
it is valuable to  recognize the potential role which information and information 
technology may play in organizational life, and it is useful to  study selected cases where 
IT  has had a powerful strategic impact, fundamental questions remain: How do 
organizations conceive of and implement strategic plans of any sort? What do we really 
know about strategic planning in organizations? 
Virtually all of the literature on the strategic role of information technology cited 
above assumes that organizations are rational goal seeking entities composed of more or 
less like minded persons who share goals and who work cooperatively towards common 
aims. Internal environments, in this view, are largely supportive. When they change, 
organizations adapt by anticipating them and then carrying out change 
programs [Zaltrnan 731. 
This venerable and sanguine view of organizational life tends to  overlook some 
powerful findings of organizational research in the last 25 years. First, organizational 
action is in part determined by the outcome of political struggles among factions and 
personalities within organizatio~l [Allison 711. The ability of an organization to  perceive 
correctly a changing reality and adopt "the right" strategic plan or technology depends 
on the outcome of these clashes. 
Second, organizational action, including any planned strategic use of IT, is largely 
constrained by bureaucratic routines honed over many years of practice. These routines 
do not change rapidly [Hannan 771. Organizations tend to  respond to  changing 
environments (internal or external) by doing more of the same thing as long as possible 
until, often, it is too late. A strategic plan, then, tends to  reflect not so much what the 
organization should do under ideal conditions, but rather what the organization is 
prepared to do given the kinds of trained specialists, bureaucratic units and routines 
available. 
Third, the perceptions which organizations and their leaders have of the 
environment are heavily influenced by powerful, unstated cultural assumptions about 
the nature of the business, employees, products, customers and suppliers [Schein 851. 
The ability of organizations to correctly perceive the environment, to correctly adapt by 
forming reasonable strategic plans, is therefore circumscribed by these bedrock cultural 
assumptions. 
Last, there is an important sense in which organizational life is random, or subject 
to dynamics and developments which appear random. Issues and problems arrive in 
organizations in unplanned, unpredictable sequence. Solution producers - all highly 
trained specialists - are ever searching for new areas to practice their preferred brand of 
solution [Cohen 721. Time driven events and routines activate various decision-makers 
and force action. Decision-makers often attach solutions to problems in a haphazard 
manner resulting in a series of uncoordinated movements [Starbuck 831. 
The view of organizations that emerges from this body of research is that what 
organizations actually do is often unreflective of their environment and often not the 
right thing at the right time. Most organizations fail, and very few of them live longer 
than a human life time [Hannan 77, Starbuck 831. What organizations plan to do (the 
formal strategic plan) is usually very different from what they actually do (the emergent 
plan) [Mintzberg 851. Virtually all empirical research on strategic planning has found 
that organizations which engage in strategic planning do no better (in any measurable 
sense of the term l1betterl1) than firms who do not practice it [Grinyer 7515. 
On the other hand, this brief review of organizational research raises some 
troubling questions for researchers and managers engaged in the strategic use of 
 his may all turn out to be a great blessing. If organizations actually carried out their five year 
strategic plans, they would have to ignore important environmental changes which occur in shorter time 
frames. 
information technology. First, how can organizations discover appropriate strategic 
opportunities, some of them involving the use of information technology? Second, how 
can organizations develop the necessary political and bureaucratic support t o  implement 
strategic I T  investments? Third, how well does the strategic planning cycle for IT  fit 
with that  of the firm? In other words, how does the input, process, time line, and 
output of I T  strategic planning mesh with that  of the normal planning process?. Is it 
possible, or even desirable t o  closely coordinate strategic IT  investments with the plans 
of the firm? Finally, where in the normal strategic planning process does consideration 
of the opportunities presented by IT  take place and what is necessary for this to  occur? 
I t  is these issues that  the authors represented in this book address. 
Research Issues 
The field has moved from a perspective of classifying the strategic uses of 
information technology to  describing its successful strategic application. I t  is time, 
however, to  go further and ask deeper research questions about the process by which 
these outcomes come about. 
There is a tendency t o  think of technology as the driving force behind strategic 
applications of IT. The notion set forth in the literature is that  decision-makers sit 
around inspecting the value chain and linkages searching for opportunities to  apply IT  
in order t o  gain competitive advantage. This view may place undue emphasis on IT  
and certainly it is top down. In actual fact, I T  may well play much more of a 
secondary role. The strategic application may well be the result of a keen analysis of 
business needs. I t  could also be that  really good IT  applications come from the bottom 
up fighting to  overcome social inertia, gathering political and popular support along the 
way, a thought consistent with studies of other innovations. Consequently, i t  is 
important t o  learn much more about how strategic applications were conceived. 
Second, given the results of organizational research into strategy formulation, 
much more careful analysis is needed on just how strategic IT  plans were, in fact, 
implemented. There is a general lack of attention, in the existing literature, t o  this 
process. 
Third, much more information is needed about failecl strategic applications of IT. 
There have indeed been some colossal ones: Federal Express' Z A P  MAIL, IBM's and 
Merrill Lynch's stock quotation system, and the IBM-Aetna Satellite Business Systems 
venture, to mention a few. It may be much easier to identify the causes of failure than 
to agree on those factors which lead to  success6. 
Finally, the implicit model behind much of the literature is that building strategic 
applications is an example of purposeful, goal directed behavior. There is some 
indication that the strategic use of information technology has an opportunistic 
component. Projects started for one purpose often end up being used for a totally 
different one. It is not at all clear that American Airlines built Sabre with the notion of 
controlling the flow of information to travel agents thereby promoting their own flights 
over the competition. More likely, they decided to  replace some of the manual record 
keeping supporting their counter staff for purposes of improved accuracy and timeliness 
and then, slowly, began to realize the opportunities the system presented for being used 
in a competitive (strategic) manner. 
Sabre probably wasn't built because deregulation was anticipated, but it did 
permit American to have the information needed so they could experiment with many 
different fare structures and optimize their return. American Hospital Supply - often 
touted as the premiere example of the planned use of strategic systems - actually 
evolved a number of systems slo-cvly over a long period of time. In reality, strategic uses 
of information technology may require supportive cultures to thrive, may have to be 
nurtured for quite a while, and may need heavy commitments of human and financial 
resources. 
6 ~ h e  research approach, currently in vogue, of describing successful applications of IT  as cases is 
misleading because it  over emphasizes successful outcomes. Cases, which tend t o  be written after the fact, 
aggrandize successful results, rationalize behaviors and infrequently capture tensions and negative events. 
As such, they can present a distorted and misleading view. 
Plan of the Book 
The articles in section 11, the first portion of the book describe the organizational 
context or setting in which strategic moves are made. Section I11 contains articles that 
illustrate specific implementations of strategic systems. Section IV covers important 
underlying technologies and shows how they relate to the process of strategy 
formulation. 
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